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130 Michigan Law Review 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SALES-
Sections 2-508 and 2-608-Limitations on 
the Perfect-Tender Rule 
[Vol, 69 
Just as parties to marriage contracts do not always live happily 
ever after, it is a fact of commercial life that a buyer and seller do not 
always live happily ever after the consummation of a sales contract. 
Even when the seller is satisfied with the arrangement, the buyer 
may try to cancel the contract either because he believes the seller 
has not and will not live up to his promise, or because changed cir-
cumstances have caused the buyer to feel that his purchase was not 
a good deal. 
Buyer attempts to avoid sales contracts can occur in two contexts 
_:_merchants dealing with each other at arm's length, and merchants 
dealing with consumers. Contracts casebooks are full of cases in-
volving merchant-buyers who cornered the glue or bolt market only 
to watch the price subsequently plummet. It was early observed that 
such a buyer will "often try to escape from a performance within the 
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business understanding of the contract, though not quite the legal, 
if he finds either that he can purchase the very same goods at a 
cheaper price on the open market or that his resale market has all 
but disappeared."1 Of course, the merchant-buyer may be dissatisfied 
with his seller's performance or delivery, and therefore refuse to 
accept the tendered goods. In either situation, the buyer's balk de-
prives the seller of his bargain-the price-and may leave him with 
a shipment of unwanted goods. 
Many cases in recent years have involved consumers who have 
purchased articles from merchants that have turned out to be de-
fective. 2 When the consumer-buyer discovers a defect or becomes gen-
erally dissatisfied with his purchase, he also may try to cancel the 
contract or have the defective product replaced. Consumers, how-
ever, are usually in a weaker position to free themselves from sales 
contracts than are merchant-buyers. This weak bargaining position 
is usually a result of the consumer's limited finances and lack of tech-
nical knowledge-which may have prevented him from immediately 
discovering the defect-and of the relative insignificance of the 
transaction to the seller.3 On the other hand, a consumer may re-
gret having signed on the dotted line because the purchase looms as 
too great an expense or because he has discovered that he can make 
a better buy elsewhere. In such a case the fickle consumer may react 
like the foiled glue speculator and try to escape his contract. 
An apparent solution to the buyer's predicament in all of these 
situations is to identify a defect in the seller's tender and demand 
that the contract be cancelled. While the buyer in a construction or 
personal-service contract must pay for an incomplete performance at 
the contract price-less damages caused by the breach-as long as 
the seller's breach is not "material,"4 this doctrine of "substantial 
performance" is inapplicable to contracts for the sale of goods.15 The 
substantial-performance doctrine guarantees the buyer that he will 
not have to pay the full contract price for a defective performance, 
and guarantees the seller that he will get paid for his work even 
1. Eno, Price Movement and Unstated Objections to the Defective Performance of 
Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L.J. 782, 801 (1935), quoted in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS 8c 
J. WHITE, CoMMERCIAL TRANSACllONS 719 (1969). 
2. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
3. The consumer's weak bargaining position has been widely discussed. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) [2 UCC 
REP. SERV. 955]; H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER (1961); Skilton 8c Helstad, Protection 
of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commerdal Code, 65 MICH. L. 
REV. 1465 (1967). 
4. See Jacob 8c Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); R.EsTATE· 
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1932); Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 
COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1942). 
5. See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS 8c J. WHITE, supra note 1, at 716; UNIFORM COM· 
MERCIAL CoDE [hereinafter UCCJ § 2-601(a). 
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though he tendered a technically imperfect performance. While the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U CC or Code) does not recognize this 
doctrine, it does acknowledge the need for protecting the interests 
of both buyers and sellers in this type of situation. 
!. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Section 2-601 6 of the UCC gives a buyer of goods a right to reject 
for any nonconformity to the contract specifications. While this sec-
tion essentially codifies the "perfect tender" rule of pre-Code sales 
law,7 it expressly limits that rule by referring to section 2-612, which 
pertains to installment contracts, and sections 2-718 and 2-719, which 
allow contractual limitations on remedies. Moreover, other provi-
sions in the Code have the effect of restricting the perfect-tender 
concept. 8 This Note will examine how the courts have applied two 
such sections-2-508 and 2-608-to protect the interests of buyers 
and sellers after tender. 
In brief, section 2-508 limits the buyer's right to reject for non-
conformity under section 2-601,9 not by narrowing the range of 
activity available to him, but by giving the seller a right to cure a 
nonconforming defect.10 Thus, while the buyer may have the right 
to reject the initial tender of goods, the parallel right of the seller 
6. UCC § 2-601 provides: 
Subject to the /rovisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts 
(Section 2-612) an unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual 
limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
7. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 
199, 206 (1963). 
8. Other devices for mitigating § 2-601 are § 2-614 (substituted performance on 
failure of agreed manner of delivery), and § 2-504 (rejection only for "material loss or 
delay" ensuing from failure to make proper shipment). See Peters, supra note 7, at 209; 
and 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REv!SION CoMMN. REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 483 n.240 (1955). 
As for the right of rejection itself: 
The Code links the buyer's right to reject with the discoverability of defects. 
Under 2-513(1) and 2-606(1), the buyer has a right to determine whether he wants 
to keep tendered goods or not; no implication of acceptance flows from buyer's 
custody until he had an opportunity to inspect. This opportunity is, however, 
a double-edged sword, for its availability precludes subsequent rejection for defects 
immediately discoverable. 
Peters, supra note 7, at 207. 
9. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
10. UCC § 2-508 provides: 
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-conform-
ing and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably 
notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract time 
make a conforming delivery. 
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allow-
ance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonablr: 
time to substitute a confo:::ming tender. 
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to cure the defect makes avoiding the contract much more difficult. 
Section 2-608, on the other hand, works in a more circular manner. 
The thrust of its mitigating force arises from the fact that once accep-
tance is made, the buyer can revoke his acceptance only if there is a 
nonconformity which substantially impairs the product's value to 
him.11 Since the general right to reject is lost under section 2-608 
when the goods are accepted, and since under the terms of section 
2-606 acceptance is accomplished fairly easily by "any act inconsistent 
with the seller's ownership" or by failure to reject after a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect,12 the right of revocation is probably as im-
portant to buyers as is the right of rejection.13 
This Note will first consider each of the two sections in isolation 
-beginning with section 2-508-and then will examine the confusion 
which has arisen from the courts' failure properly to distinguish 
between the two provisions. 
IJ. SECTION 2-508: CURE BY SELLER OF IMPROPER TENDER OF 
DELIVERY; REPLACEMENT 
A. Section 2-508(1) 
Section 2-508(1) grants the seller the right to make a conforming 
delivery to correct a defect in the original tender as long as the 
11. UCC § 2-608 provides: 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose 
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured 
and it has not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably 
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the 
seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the 
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any sub-
stantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. 
It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to 
the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
12. UCC § 2-606 provides: 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller 
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite 
of their non-conformity: or 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), but 
such acce_ptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable 
opportumty to inspect them; or 
(c) does an}' act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is 
wrongful as against the seller it is an accel?tance only if ratified by him. 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit 1s acceptance of that entire unit. 
It is possible that the draftsmen intended that § 2-606(l)(c) operate only in the 
specific case in which the buyer had attempted rejection and had thereafter used the 
goods. The language of the UCC and of the official comments, however, does not sup-
port that interpretation. 
13. Concerning the importance of the right of revocation, it has been said: "Be-
cause the complexity of many goods and the casualness of most inspections naturally 
contribute to a high incidence of acceptance, a thorough appreciation of this 'posture' 
by the commercial lawyer is required." R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra 
note 1, at 734. 
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time for contract performance has not expired. This provlSlon 
approximates the rules developed prior to the drafting of the 
Code.14 The pre-Code law, however, placed one significant quali-
fication on the seller's ability to correct a defect by making a con-
forming delivery-the buyer was not required to accept the second 
tender if he had reasonably believed that the nonconforming tender 
was the only one that would be made and had therefore changed his 
position.15 The Code has apparently adopted this qualification, al-
though not explicitly. Section 2-508(1) requires that the seller 
"seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure." [Emphasis 
added.] Thus, "If the seller has not indicated his intention to cure 
and the buyer changes his position, it could readily be concluded 
that the seller failed to give 'seasonable notice.' "16 
Possibly because of its similarity to pre-Code law, litigation over 
section 2-508(1) seems to be nonexistent. However, one case17 has 
been criticized for not considering this provision.18 Moreover, it is 
difficult to determine how many other cases decided under section 
2-508(2) could have come under subsection (1), because the courts 
do not always identify the date of delivery specified by the contract. 
B. Section 2-508(2) 
Section 2-508(2) provides that when a buyer rejects a noncon-
forming tender which the seller had "reasonable grounds to believe 
would be acceptable," the seller may, if he seasonably notifies the 
buyer, have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming 
tender. The obvious effect of the provision is to extend the seller's 
time for performance. The language does, however, raise at least 
two issues that deserve some attention. 
I. Reasonable Grounds To Believe 
The "reasonable grounds to believe" language has caused the 
courts the most difficulty in interpreting section 2-508. Comment 2 
indicates that "reasonable grounds to believe" that the tender would 
be acceptable "can lie in prior course of dealing, course of perfor-
mance or usage of trade as well as in the particular circumstances 
surrounding the making of the contract.''19 But the courts, in the de-
14. See 2 s. WILLISTON, SALES § 459 (rev. ed. 1948). 
15. Id. 
16. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CO?s!MN. REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 484 (1955). 
17. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 
1968) [5 UCC REP. SERV. 30). 
18. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Rejection and Revocation-Seller's Right 
To Cure a Nonconforming Tender, 15 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 938, 946 n.35 (1969). 
19. UCC § 2-508, comment 2. 
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cided cases under section 2-508(2), seem to be developing a "magni-
tude of defect" test for determining the reasonableness of the seller's 
grounds. 
A District of Columbia case, Wilson v. Scampoli,20 involved a 
new color television set having a red cast to the picture. Refusing to 
allow the seller to remove the set for repairs, the buyer first de-
manded a new set and then sought return of her money. The court, 
however, permitted cure because only "minor" repairs were re-
quired. In so doing, the court quoted Dean Hawkland, an advocate 
of the magnitude-of-defect approach: "The seller, then, should 
be able to cure ... under subsection 2-508(2) in those cases in which 
he can do so without subjecting the buyer to any great inconven-
ience, risk or loss."21 Cure was also allowed in Bartus v. Riccardi22 
because the nonconforming product, a hearing aid, was newer 
and more expensive than the model actually ordered. In a third 
case, Zabriskie Chevrolet, Incorporated v. Smith,23 the New Jersey 
superior court refused to permit an automobile dealer to cure a 
defective transmission. The court found that the defect rendered 
the new car "practically inoperable,"24 and therefore held that the 
seller could not reasonably expect the buyer to accept the car. 
The ruling of Zabriskie Chevrolet has been criticized as develop-
ing a wholly separate major-minor defect test without basis in the 
Code.25 While it probably would be contrary to the draftsmen's in-
tent to apply the magnitude-of-defect concept as a conclusive test, 
such a standard is surely a relevant factor in determining the reason-
ableness of the seller's expectations.26 On the basis of the three deci-
sions to date-all handed down by inferior courts-it would be 
premature to conclude that this factor has become exclusively de-
terminative of whether a seller had reasonable grounds to believe 
that a tender would be acceptable.27 
20. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) [4 UCC REP. SERV. 178]. 
21. Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and 
Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. R.Ev. 697, 724 (1962), quoted at 228 A.2d at 850 
[4 UCC REP. SERV. at 181]. 
22. 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Utica City Ct. 1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 845]. 
2!1. N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968) [5 UCC REP. SERv. 30]. 
24. 99 N.J. Super. at 457, 240 A.2d at 204 [5 UCC REP. SERv. at 41]. 
25. See Note, supra note 18, at 946-50. 
26. Id. at 949. 
27. In all three of the cases dealing with this issue, the magnitude of the non-
conformity could be seen as a factor in determining whether usage of trade would 
normally allow the seller to cure-i.e., if past usage of trade had permitted the cure 
of minor defects, then the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that minor defects 
could properly be cured. In Zabriskie Chevrolet the court reasoned that although usage 
of trade permitted the repair of major as well as of minor defects, such custom was 
contrary to public policy and should not be judicially enforced. 99 N.J. Super, 
at 456, 240 A.2d at 204 [5 UCC REP. SERV. at 41]. Another court could just as easily 
conclude that such custom and usage should be conclusive. 
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Regardless of whether the magnitude-of-defect concept is seen as 
an independent test or merely as a factor in determining reason-
ableness, it does signify an attempt by the courts to protect the 
buyer as well as the seller. To refuse to permit a seller to make a 
minor adjustment of a color television set deprives him of his bar-
gain simply because the set may have been jostled somewhat during 
delivery. On the other hand, permitting a seller to patch up an in-
operable car forces the buyer to keep a product for which he did 
not bargain and which he does not want. To this extent, then, the 
magnitude-of-defect standard is a useful method of weighing the 
interests of both parties and protecting their rights under the con-
tract. 
The response of the court in Zabriskie tended to give more weight 
to the interests of consumers: 
For a majority of people the purchase of a new car is a major 
investment, rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from its 
dependability and safety. Once their faith is shaken, the vehicle 
loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument 
whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is 
fraught with apprehension. The attempted cure in the present case 
was ineffective.28 
This approach also seems to rely on a subjective test based on the 
consumer-buyer's feelings towards the defective car. The court in 
Wilson v. Scampoli,29 however, seemed to look solely at objective 
factors such as the buyer's inconvenience and risk. These cases may 
nevertheless be reconciled by reference to the reasonableness of the 
buyer's fears. The Scampoli court may have concluded that even if 
the buyer was subjectively apprehensive about her television set, 
such apprehension was unreasonable in light of the triviality of the 
defect. The Zabriskie court, on the other hand, apparently con-
cluded that it was reasonable for a consumer's faith in the "depend-
ability and safety" of a new car to be shaken when an integral part 
-the transmission-broke down shortly after delivery. 
Thus, in trying case by case to work out what constitutes "rea-
sonable grounds" for the seller to believe a tender would be accept-
able, the courts appear to be trying to carry out the avowed purpose 
of section 2-508(2)-"to avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a 
surprise rejection by the buyer"30-but in so doing at least one 
court, in the Zabriskie case, has expressed a concern for the con-
28. 99 N.J. Super. at 458,240 A.2d at 205 [5 UCC REP. SERV. at 42]. 
29. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 178]. See text accompanying 
notes 20·21 supra. 
30. UCC § 2-508, comment 2. See also notes 21 &: 22 supra and accompanying text. 
In both Scampoli and Bartus the buyer absolutely refused the seller's curative tender 
regarding a minor defect, but the sellers in both cases were granted the right to cure. 
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sumer's interest by taking a restrictive view of the kinds of defects 
which the seller has a "right" to cure. 
2. Further Reasonable Time 
If the seller establishes that he had reasonable grounds to believe 
that a tender would be acceptable, section 2-508(2) grants him "a 
further reasonable time [beyond the contract date] to substitute a 
conforming tender."31 As official comment 3 makes clear, the words 
"further reasonable time" are intended as words of limitation to pro-
tect the buyer.32 That such a limitation is needed, and has been used 
to protect the buyer from abuse of the right to cure, is illustrated by 
Tiger Motor Company v. McMurtry.33 In that case the buyer was 
forced to return a new car at least thirty times during the course of 
a year to correct a multitude of defects. The Alabama supreme court 
held that a seller did not have an unlimited period of time to cure 
under section 2-508(2), but it failed to define specifically what should 
constitute a reasonable time. The court merely stated that "at some 
point after the purchase of a new automobile, the same should be 
put in good running condition,"34 and concluded that that point had 
been reached after one year. 
In Bartus v. Riccardi35 it was held that one week did not exceed 
the reasonable-time limit of section 2-508(2). The court, however, 
seemed to determine this issue on the basis of whether the buyer had 
changed position between the time of rejection and attempted cure. 
Finding that the buyer had not purchased a new hearing aid to re-
place the one that had been mistakenly delivered to him, and 
which was more expensive that the hearing aid he had ordered, 
the court concluded that he had not changed his position. It there-
fore recognized the seller's right to cure. Although the result in 
Bartus was probably satisfactory on the facts there presented, 
change of position does not seem to be generally acceptable as a con-
clusive test for determining reasonable time. In a large number of 
cases-including most consumer cases-a buyer will not take any 
affirmative action to alter his position since he expects the seller to 
cure the defect. Thus, in a case like Tiger Motor, as long as the 
buyer does not change his position the seller could go on indefinitely 
attempting to cure an inoperable product. More properly, a court 
should determine whether a reasonable time has expired by exam-
ining the particular facts before it. Among the factors that could 
!II. For the full text of UCC § 2-508(2), see note IO supra. 
!12. UCC § 2-508, comment 3. 
!13. 284 Ala. 283, 224 S.2d 638 (1969) [6 UCC REP. SERv. 608]. 
!14. 284 Ala. at 293, 224 S.2d at 647 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 620], quoting from General 
Motors Corp. v. Earnest, 279 Ala. 299, 302, 184 S.2d 8ll, 814 (1966). 
!15. 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Utica City Ct. 1967). See text accompanying 
note 22 supra. 
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appropriately be considered-in addition to change of position by 
the buyer-are the amount of inconvenience caused the buyer and 
the period of time necessary for the seller to complete his cure.36 
Ill. SECTION 2-608: REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE IN 
WHOLE OR IN PART 
The finality of the perfect-tender concept of section 2-601 is 
further eroded by section 2-608, which permits revocation of ac-
ceptance under certain circumstances if a nonconformity substan-
tially impairs the accepted product's value to the buyer.37 As the 
official comment observes: 
The section no longer speaks of "rescission," a term capable of am-
biguous application either to transfer of title to the goods or to the 
contract of sale and susceptible also of confusion with cancellation 
for cause of an executed or executory portion of the contract. The 
remedy under this section is instead referred to simply as "revoca-
tion of acceptance" of goods tendered under a contract for sale and 
involves no suggestion of "election" of any sort.38 
The section sets out several conditions which must be met before a 
contract can be avoided through revocation after acceptance. 
A. Section 2-608(1) 
I. Substantial Impairment of Value 
The first condition of section 2-608 is that the nonconformity 
must substantially impair the value of the goods to the buyer. Courts 
have been reluctant to make any general statements concerning what 
constitutes substantial impairment. As one court has commented: 
"Each case must be carefully examined on its own merits to deter-
mine what is a 'substantial impairment of value.' We are aware that 
what may cause one person great inconvenience or financial loss, may 
not another.''39 
Nonetheless, a significant factor in determining substantiality 
may now be emerging-the concept of "ease of correcting the de-
fect." In a Pennsylvania case, Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mer-
cury Company,40 the buyer of a new car twice returned it to the 
36. For a discussion of reasonable time in the context of other UCC provisions, see 
Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963) [I UCC REP. 
SERV. 125]; Steel v. J.I. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966); Cox Motor Car Co. 
v. Castle, 402 S.W .2d 429 (Ky. 1966) [3 UCC REP. SERV. 397]; Casey v. Philadelphia Auto 
Sales Co., 428 Pa. 155, 236 A.2d 800 (1968) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 1012]. 
37. For the full text of UCC § 2-608, see note 11 supra. 
38. UCC § 2-608, comment I. See also Hawkland, supra note 21, at 725. 
39. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 292, 224 S.2d 638, 646 (1969) [6 
ucc REP. SERV. 608, 618]. 
40. 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) [3 UCC REP. SERV. 1025]. 
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dealer because of a loud noise that it made. Even though the cause 
of the defect was determined, the buyer demanded that the dealer 
either give him another new car or return his trade-in. The court 
remanded this issue to the lower court, stating, "The reason why 'a 
substantial impairment of value' must take place before a revocation 
under Section 2-608 may take force is to preclude revocation for 
trivial defects or defects which may be easily corrected."41 Similarly, 
a county court in another Pennsylvania case, Grucella v. General 
Motors Corporation,42 decided that a defect which hindered the 
ability to control a car was minor; the court stressed that the car 
could be, and in fact had been, easily repaired. Tiger Motor Com-
pany v. McMurtry43 involved an automobile that the owner had 
returned to the dealer more than thirty times during a one-year 
period. The defects were never completely eliminated, and the court 
held that the buyer had properly revoked his acceptance. Although 
the opinion was silent on the point, it seems obvious that the ex-
treme difficulty or impossibility of cure influenced the Arkansas 
court's determination that the impairment was substantial. Campbell 
v. Pollack,44 a Rhode Island case, likewise involved a defect that 
was held to be substantial because it could not be cured.45 
Based on a factual determination, the Oregon supreme court held 
in Lanners v. Whitney46 that the "unairworthiness" of a used airplane 
substantially impaired its value to the buyer. Although the court did 
refer to a dispute in the testimony as to whether the buyer ever made 
demands for adjustment to the seller, it did not say whether cure was 
ever attempted or whether it could have been accomplished easily. 
Thus, this case could be restrictively viewed as simply deciding that 
airworthiness of a used aircraft is of crucial significance to its buyer. 
However, the technological defects that cause unairworthiness 
would also tend to make correction a difficult and significant under-
taking. Therefore, Lanners may be read to support the general 
proposition that a factual determination must be made in each in-
dividual case in order to determine whether the nonconformity 
seriously decreased the value of the goods to the buyer. Given this 
view of the Lanners case, the ease of curability of the defect appears 
to be recognized by at least four courts as one factor which can be 
properly used to determine the substantiality of a defect. 
41. 209 Pa. Super. at 124, 224 A.2d at 789 [3 UCC REP. SERv. at 1027) (emphasis 
added). 
42. 10 Pa. D. &: C.2d 65 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1956). 
43. 284 Ala. 283, 224 S.2d 638 (1969) (6 UCC REP. SERv. 608]. 
44. 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966) [3 UCC REP. SERv. 703]. 
45. Campbell involved a defect of title. For a similar holding as to installment con-
tracts, see Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans Holterbosch, Inc., 101 N.J. Super. 61, 243 A.2d 
253 (App. Div. 1968) [5 UCC REP. SERV. 369]. 
46. 247 Ore. 223,428 P.2d 398 (1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 369]. 
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An alternative method of measuring substantial impairment of 
value is to determine the decrease in the product's fair market value 
that is caused by the defect. Under this method, if the cost of 
bringing the goods up to contract conformity is insubstantial in 
comparison with the contract price, the value would not be substan-
tially impaired. Since the expense of cure should normally vary in-
versely with the ease of curability, this approach is really a quanti-
fication of the ease-of-curability approach. However, the courts have 
not yet discussed the substantial-impairment issue in these terms. 
2. Grounds of Acceptance 
The second condition which section 2-608(1)47 imposes on the 
buyer's right to revoke acceptance concerns the basis of the buyer's 
acceptance. In order to be able to revoke, the buyer must have ac-
cepted the goods on the reasonable but unfulfilled assumption that 
the nonconformity would be cured. Alternatively, if there had been 
no discovery of the nonconformity, the buyer's acceptance must have 
been induced by the difficulty of discovery or by the seller's assur-
ances. 
a. Defects discovered before acceptance. It is difficult to pinpoint 
exactly what factors should be used to determine when the buyer has a 
basis for a reasonable assumption that a known defect48 would be cured 
-the 2-608(l)(a) situation-because there appear to be no published 
decisions involving such a factual situation. A possibly useful line of 
thinking may, however, be suggested. Under section 2-608(l)(b)49 a 
buyer can revoke his acceptance of a product with an undiscovered 
defect if he can show that his acceptance was induced by the seller's 
assurances that such defects would be cured.50 It is submitted that a 
similar, though more flexible, standard could usefully be incorpo-
rated into section 2-608(l)(a), since a buyer who accepts a product 
with a known defect would seldom have a reasonable basis for as-
suming that the defect would be cured unless he has received some 
indication, express or implied, to that effect from the seller. Such 
an indication could be communicated by oral assurances or by writ-
ten warranty. It is less clear whether, absent a direct expression, an 
implied warranty of merchantability would be sufficient assurance for 
47. See note 11 supra. 
48. Since UCC § 2-608(l)(b) explicitly states that it applies only to acceptances made 
without discovery of the nonconformity, it appears that § 2-608(1)(a) was intended 
to apply to acceptances made of products with known defects. Any other construction 
would mean that both paragraphs (a) and (b) would apply to the undiscovered defect 
situation. 
49. See notes 52-64 infra and accompanying text. 
50. See Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W .2d 191 (1964) 
[2 UCC REP. SERv. 273). 
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the buyer to assume that a known defect would be cured. That ques-
tion could turn on the buyer's knowledge of the law of implied war-
ranties at the time of acceptance.51 
b. Defects discovered after acceptance. Paragraph (b) of sec-
tion 2-608(1) deals with the more common situation of the buyer 
being unaware of the defect at the time of acceptance. Under those 
circumstances a buyer may subsequently revoke only if the noncon-
formity was difficult to discover or if he was induced to accept 
without discovery because of the seller's assurances. Official com-
ment 3 to section 2-608 notes that with regard to paragraph (b), 
" 'assurances' • . . can rest as well in the circumstances or in the 
contract as in explicit language used at the time of delivery. The 
reason for recognizing such assurances is that they induce the buyer 
to delay discovery." With an amazing uniformity, the cases have de-
manded actual inducement to delay discovery before they will find 
"assurances." 
In Lanners v. Whitney52 the court explicitly held that assurances 
of airworthiness were reasonably relied upon by the buyer and that 
he was thereby actually induced to accept the plane without first 
inspecting it. In Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Company58 
the court found that the buyer did not discover the nonconformity 
before acceptance of the automobile because he had not had an 
opportunity to drive it. Therefore, "he accepted on the basis of 
the usual warranties (assurances) which are part of new car sales."54 
It appears that the court engaged in similar reasoning in Zabriskie 
51. There are several cases which hold that a warranty, whether explicit or implied, 
can constitute seller's assurances for purposes of UCC § 2-608(l)(b). See Rozmus v. 
Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 124, 224 A.2d 782, 784 (1966) 
[3 UCC REP. SERV. 1025, 1028], in which the court said that "he [the buyer] accepted 
on the basis of the usual warranties (assurances) which are part of new car sales"; and 
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968) [5 
UCC REP. SERv. 30], in which the court would have allowed revocation based on a 
breach of implied warranty as an alternative to its finding of rejection. See also Tiger 
Motor Co. v. Mcl\lurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 S.2d 638 (1969) [6 UCC REP. SERV. 608], which 
is interesting for the error the Alabama court made in failing to draw the distinction 
between paragraphs {a) and (b) of § 2-608(1). In that case a new car was covered by an 
express warranty. Referring to paragraph (a) without citing it, the court stated that, 
"Obviously, McMurtry purchased the automobile on the reasonable assumption that 
any nonconforming defects would be cured." 284 Ala. at 293, 224 S.2d at 647 [6 UCC 
REP. SERV. at 619]. In that case, however, as in most new-car cases, the buyer did not 
know of any defects before acceptance, i:.s required by paragraph (a). Nevertheless, he 
still had the option of revoking under paragraph (b), because he had been induced 
to accept by the seller's assurances in the form of the warranty. 
52. 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 369]. See text accompanying 
note 46 supra. 
53. 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) [3 UCC REP. SERV. 1025]. See text ac-
companying note 40 supra. 
54. 209 Pa. Super. at 124, 224 A.2d at 784 [3 UCC REP. SERV. at 1028]. 
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Chevrolet, 55 although the language of the decision is not completely 
clear on this point. 
In Lawner v. Engelbach56 the Pennsylvania supreme court, in 
allowing revocation of acceptance, relied heavily on the buyer's 
right to inspect under section 2-513(1).57 In that case, a jewelry 
dealer claimed that a ring was worth 30,000 dollars and offered to 
rescind the sale if it were appraised at a lesser value. The buyer paid 
for the ring and took it to an appraiser who valued the ring at only 
15,000 dollars. It is submitted that the court's reliance on a right 
to inspect under section 2-513(1) was misplaced, even though it was 
in the spirit of the other decisions requiring inducement to delay 
inspection. Section 2-513(1) gives the buyer the right to inspect 
"before payment or acceptance" [emphasis added]; under section 
2-608, however, acceptance must already have occurred before it can 
be revoked. The court's alternative approach appears to stand on 
more solid ground. Under this approach, the court found that the 
jeweler's original offer to rescind the sale constituted an express 
warranty under section 2-313(l)(a).58 When the ring failed to live 
up to its warranty, the court concluded that the buyer "had the 
right to revoke her acceptance of the ring under UCC §§ 2-711(1) 
and 2-608(1)."59 Thus, the buyer can be seen as having been induced 
by the seller's assurances to accept the ring without discovery of the 
defect. 
Campbell v. Pollack60 is one of the few cases decided under sec-
tion 2-608(l)(b) that does not explicitly mention actual induce-
ment to delay discovery as a necessary element of an assurance. 
However, the buyer there actually was induced to accept the con-
tents of a car wash business without investigating title, by the seller's 
assurances that he was selling "everything within the four walls."61 
A New Mexico case, Grandi v. LeSage,62 held that representations 
55. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968) [5 UCC REP. SERV. 30). See note 
23 supra and accompanying text. 
56. 433 Pa. 311, 249 A.2d 295 (1969). 
57. UCC § 2-513(1) provides: 
(I) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where goods are ten-
dered or delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before 
payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in 
any reasonable manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send the 
goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after their arrival. 
58. UCC § 2-313(l)(a) provides: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
59. 443 Pa. at 316, 249 A.2d at 298. 
60. 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966) [3 UCC REP. SERV. 703). 
61. 101 R.I. at 226, 221 A.2d at 617 [3 UCC REP. SERv. at 705]. 
62. 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965) [2 UCC REP. SERv. 455]. 
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made in a racing form as to the sex of a horse constituted assur-
ances within the meaning of section 2-608(l)(b) for purposes of a 
claiming-race sale. Since the customs of racing did not allow an 
inspection before such a race, the effect of the representation was 
to induce the buyer to delay his discovery. Thus, the seller's assur-
ances can come in the form of explicit oral promises, written war-
ranties, or printed descriptions of the goods. 
Seller's assurances are not necessary for a revocation under para-
graph (b) if the defect is difficult to discover. In another horse sale 
case the court in Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Incorporated63 rea-
soned that: 
Since a finding of acceptance [under section 2-606(l)(b)] depends 
upon a finding that there was a reasonable opportunity to inspect, 
the question whether acceptance may be revoked [ under section 
2-608(I)(b)] as reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery be-
fore acceptance . . . must be answered by reference to the scope of 
the inspection which there was a reasonable opportunity to make.64 
Because the inspection normally allowed at a horse auction would 
have disclosed the defect of the horse (a broken bone), the court 
denied revocation. Therefore, in cases based on difficulty of dis-
covery, as well as in cases based on seller's assurances, the buyer's 
right to inspect often will constitute the determining issue. 
B. Section 2-608(2) 
Whether the buyer discovers the defect before or after acceptance, 
section 2-608(2) requires that he notify the seller of his revocation 
of acceptance within a reasonable time after he discovers or should 
have discovered the ground for it, and before any substantial change 
in the condition of the goods occurs that is not caused by their own 
defects.65 The official comment offers a guideline for defining area-
sonable time period: 
Since this remedy will be generally resorted to only after attempts 
at adjustment have failed, the reasonable time period should extend 
in most cases beyond the time in which notification of breach must 
be given, beyond the time for discovery of non-conformity after ac-
ceptance and beyond the time for rejection after tender.66 
63. 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968). 
64. 400 F.2d at 119-20. 
65. For the text of UCC § 2-608(2), see note 11 supra. 
66. UCC § 2-608, comment 4. Comment 5 states that "More will generally be neces-
sary [under this section] than the mere notification of breach •••• " The two forms of 
notice therefore should be distinguished. Notice of breach occurs when the buyer lets 
the seller know that he is dissatisfied with the goods. Notice of revocation, however, 
is the buyer's communication, after acceptance, that he no longer wants the goods 
and that he desires to cancel the sale. According to § 2-607(3), if the buyer does not 
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This suggestion therefore emphasizes the length of negotiations and 
attempted adjustments as the major criteria for determining what 
constitutes reasonable time. However, the courts also seem to be 
developing the concept of "difficulty of discovery" as another factor 
in determining reasonable time. 
For example, in Schneider v. Person61 a Pennsylvania court re-
fused to decide as a matter of law that 6½ months was an unreason-
able period of time for a buyer to wait before revoking acceptance 
of a horse that suffered from leg splints. Although delays of six68 
and nine69 months had been found unreasonable as a matter of law 
in earlier cases, the court stated that those cases were distinguishable 
because one involved a defect that could have been discovered eas-
ily and the other involved a merchant-buyer. Thus, although the 
Schneider case was remanded for a jury determination of whether 
the delay was unreasonable, the court left open the possibility that 
6½ months could be a reasonable time in cases involving consumer-
buyers and defects that are difficult to discover. Similarly, it was 
held in Grandi v. LeSage10 that four months was not an unreasonable 
time in which to notify the seller of the revocation of acceptance 
of a gelding which the seller had represented as a stallion. Exhibit-
ing a similar concern that "reasonable time" should reflect the time 
necessary for a buyer to discover or determine that a defect exists, 
the Arkansas supreme court in Parker v. J ohnston11 held that several 
months was not an unreasonable time for the buyer of a business 
to determine positively that the monthly income therefrom was less 
than the seller had represented. 
give the seller timely notice of breach, he is left without any remedy. Hence, unless 
the buyer gives the seller timely notice of breach and timely notice of revocation, he 
cannot revoke his acceptance. 
Following the intent of the draftsmen as expressed in comment 5, the courts 
have applied different standards for determining what constitutes reasonable time for 
rejection and reasonable time for revocation. In Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.L. 223, 221 
A.2d 615 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 703] (see notes 44-45 &: 60 supra and accompanying text), 
the court held that although a reasonable opportunity for rejection under § 2-602 had 
expired, the buyer nevertheless had timely revoked his acceptance; apparently, the 
court tacitly decided that a reasonable time under § 2-608(2) had not yet expired. 
Other cases on reasonable time for rejection under § 2-602 include: Miron v. Yonkers 
Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (see notes 63-64 supra and accompanying 
text); Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966) [3 UCC REP. 
SERV. 805]; Trailmobile Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Jones, 118 Ga. App. 472, 164 S.E.2d 
346 (1968) [5 UCC REP. SERV. 1066]; and Shreve v. Castro Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 
669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966) [3 ucc REP. SERV. 796]. 
67. 34 Pa. D. &: C.2d 10 (C.P. Lehigh County 1964) [2 UCC REP. SERV. 37]. 
68. General Foods Corp. v. Bittinger Co., 31 Pa. D. &: C.2d 282 (C.P. York County 
1963) [I ucc REP. SERV. 168]. 
69. Necho Coal Co. v. Denise Coal Co., 387 Pa. 567, 128 A.2d 771 (1957). 
70. 74 N.M. 799, 399 P .2d 285 (1965) [2 UCC REP. SERv. 455]. See note 62 supra and 
accompanying text. 
71. 244 Ark. 355, 426 S.W .2d 155 (1968) [5 UCC REP. SERV. 369]. 
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The court in Lanners v. Whitney12 also allowed the buyer to 
take the time necessary-about three weeks-to inspect fully and 
discover the extent of the nonconformity before revoking. The court 
reasoned: 
Plaintiff was not required to notify the defendant of his intention 
to revoke his acceptance until he was reasonably certain that the 
nonconformity substantially impaired the value of the airplane to 
him .... His mere suspicions prior to inspection were not sufficient 
to require notice .... Plaintiff was entitled to and did inspect the 
aircraft and made attempts to adjust the differences between the 
parties prior to revoking his acceptance.73 
Thus, reasonable time in Lanners was determined with reference to 
both difficulty of discovery and attempts at adjustment. 
In Tiger Motor Company v. McMurtry74 the court looked 
solely to how long attempts at adjustments had continued, in order 
to determine what constituted a reasonable time for purposes of 
section 2-608(2). The buyer had returned his new car to the dealer 
on at least thirty occasions but the multiple defects were never 
completely corrected. The court held that a period exceeding 
one year was a reasonable time for revocation in that case, because 
of the buyer's constant contact with the seller and the seller's con-
tinuous knowledge of the buyer's dissatisfaction. This case presented 
the type of situation which the Code commentators apparently had 
in mind when they stated that because the 2-608 remedy would 
usually be resorted to after attempts at adjustment had failed, the 
time period should therefore be longer than that allowed for rejection 
under section 2-602(1).75 
Finally, section 2-608(2) requires that revocation be made "be-
fore any substantial change in [the] condition of the goods which 
is not caused by their mvn defects." Apparently, none of the cases 
decided under section 2-608 have dealt with this issue. Official 
comment 6, however, seems to indicate that this language is solely 
concerned with physical deterioration or destruction of the goods. 
Thus, this language could impose a more restrictive time limit on the 
buyer's right of revocation when perishable goods are involved. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 2-508 ON SECTION 2-608 
A considerable amount of confusion has arisen over whether 
section 2-508(2) has any effect on revocation of acceptance under 
section 2-608. The Code, however, indicates that it does not have 
72. 247 Ore. 22!1, 428 P.2d 398 (1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 369]. See notes 46 8: 52 
supra and accompanying text. 
73. 247 Ore. at 235, 428 P .2d at 40!1-04 [4 UCC REP. SERv. at 378]. 
74. 284 Ala. 28!1, 224 S.2d 638 (1969) [6 UCC REP. SERv. 608]. 
75. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. 
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such an effect. Section 2-508(2) reads, in part: "(2) Where the 
buyer rejects a non-conforming tender . . . the seller may . . . 
have further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender."76 
Since rejection of goods must take place before acceptance-
as defined in section 2-606-occurs, and since revocation of ac-
ceptance can occur only after the buyer has accepted the goods, 
the 2-508(2) right to cure cannot arise when revocation is attempted. 
Nevertheless, some courts have assumed that a seller may attempt 
cure after receiving notice of revocation of acceptance.77 
Part of the confusion may be attributed to the Code's apparent 
inequity, since it is conceptually difficult to see why a seller should 
have a right to cure when the buyer rejects, but should not have 
such an opportunity when the buyer revokes his acceptance. This 
incongruity is heightened by the apparent ease with which accep-
tance can occur-when the buyer "does any act inconsistent with the 
seller's ownership."78 Additional confusion arises from the fact that 
courts frequently will hold in the alternative that if the buyer did 
not accept the goods, he properly rejected; if he did accept the goods, 
he properly revoked.79 Or a court may simply say that assuming 
arguendo that acceptance was made, the buyer accomplished proper 
revocation. 80 
As a result, courts have applied section 2-508 to cases where there 
was no certainty that acceptance ever occurred. Thus, in Bartus 
v. Riccardi the court held that the "further reasonable time" lan-
guage of section 2-508(2) permits the seller to cure after revocation 
76. (Emphasis added.) For the full text of UCC § 2-508(2), see note 10 supra. 
77. See notes 81-83 infra and accompanying text. 
78. UCC § 2-606(l)(c). See note 12 supra and accompanying text. The confusion 
is enhanced by the fact that courts have differed over whether acceptance has arisen 
from an identical set of facts. For example, the court in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968) [5 UCC REP. SERv. 30], held that 
a buyer did not accept a car merely by driving it home. That court reasoned that the 
first few miles in a new car constituted a "reasonable opportunity to inspect" under 
§ 2-606(l)(a), and that therefore the first drive should not be construed as an acceptance. 
99 N.J. Super. at 452-53, 240 A.2d at 201-02 [5 UCC SERV. REP. at 38]. However, in Roz. 
mus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) [3 UCC 
REP. SERV. 1025), the court held that driving a new car home does constitute ac• 
ceptance: 
He [the buyer] executed the conditional sales contract which provided that he 
acknowledged the acceptance of the Mercury in good order, and he drove it from 
the showroom to his home. Section 2-606 • • • provides that acceptance takes 
force when the buyer either signifies his acceptance to the seller or does an act 
inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 
209 Pa. Super. at 784, 224 A.2d at 784 [3 UCC REP. SERV. at 1027). 
79. E.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d (1968) [5 
ucc REP. SERV. 30). 
80. E.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 S.2d 638 (1969) [6 UCC 
REP. SERV. 608). 
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of acceptance has been attempted. 81 Although the Alabama court 
found a proper revocation in Tiger Motor, it still felt obliged to 
discuss cure. Without mentioning section 2-508, it cited Zabriskie 
Chevrolet on the cure issue, and held that the seller did not have 
an unlimited time to cure defects.82 Similarly, the discussion by the 
New Jersey court in Zabriskie Chevrolet in connection with its al-
ternative holding that revocation was accomplished if rejection was 
not, implied that section 2-508 would be effective under either 
situation.83 
While section 2-608 does introduce the concept of cure in rela-
tion to sellers' assurances under paragraph (l)(a), this mere mention 
does not confer on the seller any right to cure after acceptance. 
Cure may properly be considered as a factor in determining sub-
stantial impairment of value to the buyer84 and reasonable time 
for notification of revocation.85 But it is submitted that the notion 
that a seller has a right to attempt cure after a buyer gives notice 
of revocation of acceptance is a faulty conclusion reached by courts 
which have confused sections 2-508 and 2-608. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The confusion which has developed concerning sections 2-508 
and 2-608 may also be attributable to the fact that these two sections 
tend to serve the same general purpose; the emphasis of each section, 
however, does differ. Section 2-508 protects sellers who are willing 
and able to live up to their promises but who have failed, in rela-
tively minor respects, to make perfect tenders. In cases like Tiger 
Motor and Zabriskie Chevrolet, however, the courts, when constru-
ing that provision, have also kept in mind the interests of unsophis-
ticated consumers. Similarly, while section 2-608 grants buyers the 
post-acceptance right to cancel purchases of defective goods, courts in 
cases like Bartus have protected sellers against buyers who unrea-
sonably complain of trivial defects, by emphasizing, for example, the 
substantial-impairment requirement. 
The net effect of these two sections is to de-emphasize the finality 
of the buyer's acts of acceptance and rejection-under appropriate 
circumstances a seller may cure his defective tender, and under 
other circumstances a buyer may revoke an inopportune acceptance. 
In determining when the conditions exist that trigger these rights 
81. 55 Misc. 2d 3, 6, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (Utica City Ct. 1967) [4 UCC REP. SERv. 
845, 847). See text accompanying note 22, and see note 30 supra. 
82. 284 Ala. at 293, 224 S.2d at 647 [6 UCC SERV. REP. at 619-20]. 
83. 99 N.J. Super. at 453-54, 240 A.2d at 202-03 [5 UCC SERv. REP. at 39-40). 
84. See notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text. 
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to reject and to revoke, the courts have tended to examine the 
particular facts of each case. Such factual scrutiny is necessary since 
the cases often tum on the application of the words "reasonable" 
and "substantial." Moreover, it appears that more than one court 
has based its decision on a consideration whether the buyer is 
trying to avoid his obligation or whether he has a legitimate com-
plaint about the delivered goods. Thus, a particular case may 
simply tum on which party can establish the most factors that, 
in light of the guidelines provided by sections 2-508 and 2-608, 
support the reasonableness of his position. 
